HICKS v. E. T. LEGG & ASSOCIATES (05/25/01 – No. D034398) Civil Code 2924c(e), and 2924g(d) do not prohibit the postponement of a foreclosure sale for successive periods of five of fewer business days during the period a sale is on hold because of an injunction or bankruptcy stay.
Bankruptcy of Wytch, USBAP 9th, Nos. 97-1089 and 79-1145, 7/1/98: 11 U.S.C. Section 349(b) does reinstate a debtor’s prepetition property rights by invalidating specified bankruptcy court orders, Section 349(b) does not vacate orders for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d). real property sold 2 hours after BK filed (chapter 7) property purchased by TP with no knowledge of BK, LR brought action to annul stay, no objection , relief granted. Case inadvertently dismissed, then reinstated, DR’s argued that set aside earlier Order lifting stay – BK Court and BAP did not agree – Order lifting stay stands.
Post-Petition attorney fees based on pre-petition contract:
In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, Bankr. L. Rep. ¶ 81,515 (9th Cir., June 23, 2009), pages 154, 183 (case no. 08-60001) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a unanimous panel decision, affirmed, and adopted as its own, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2007), holding that an unsecured creditor may include, as part of its claim, attorney’s fees incurred postpetition but based on a prepetition contract. The opinion reasoned that (1) Code § 506(b), permitting an oversecured creditor to recover postpetition attorney’s fees, speaks only to the secured status of a claim, and not to its allowability; (2) the claim for attorney’s fees exists on the petition date, although it is contingent and unliquidated, as the “right to payment” exists on the petition date; thus, the claim is not disallowed under Code § 502(b)(1), requiring a bankruptcy court to “determine the amount of such claim … as of the date of the filing of the petition”; and (3) neither United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 108 S. Ct. 626, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1988) (holding that an undersecured creditor could not receive postpetition interest on the unsecured portion of its debt) nor public policy mandated disallowance of such a claim.